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Turning Internet of Things(IoT) into Internet of
Vulnerabilities (IoV) : IoT Botnets
Kishore Angrishi
Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is the next big evolutionary
step in the world of internet. The main intention behind the IoT is
to enable safer living and risk mitigation on different levels of life.
With the advent of IoT botnets, the view towards IoT devices
has changed from enabler of enhanced living into Internet of
vulnerabilities for cyber criminals. IoT botnets has exposed two
different glaring issues, 1) A large number of IoT devices are
accessible over public Internet. 2) Security (if considered at all)
is often an afterthought in the architecture of many wide spread
IoT devices. In this article, we briefly outline the anatomy of
the IoT botnets and their basic mode of operations. Some of the
major DDoS incidents using IoT botnets in recent times along
with the corresponding exploited vulnerabilities will be discussed.
We also provide remedies and recommendations to mitigate IoT
related cyber risks and briefly illustrate the importance of cyber
insurance in the modern connected world. Index Terms—DDoS,
IoT, IoT Botnets, Mirai Botnet, Cyber Insurance, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is key in the digital world of
connected living. The futuristic appeal to make life bit more
enjoyable in a hectic day-to-day routine is enticing to many.
For example, the idea of refrigerators monitoring their contents
and send orders directly to the retailers when the milk is run-
ning out or ordering Sunday morning bread from your bed with
a voice or gesture command to an intelligent assistants like
Amazon Alexa or Apple Siri or Google Assistant is appealing.
With the advent of smart phones, smart television, and more
smart devices like Amazon echo with Alexa or Google Home,
most of the ideas stated above are not part of some science
fiction dream anymore but rather becoming a reality right now.
The IoT devices have a wide range of applications (see Fig:
1) especially in home automation (smart home), healthcare,
smart energy solutions, autonomous connected vehicles and
extremely complicated industrial control systems. According
to a study [1] we have now (2016) have 9 billion smart
devices (excluding smart phones, tablets and computers) and
is anticipated to grow to 28.1 billion by 2020. By 2025, the
value of the internet of things will be trillions annually (see
Fig: 2) [2].
It is important to understand that these smart devices cannot
be seen as specialized devices with intelligence built-in but
rather as computers which does specialized jobs. For examples,
Disclaimer: The views expressed here are solely those of the author in his
private capacity and do not in any way represent the views of the Munich
RE, or any other entity of the Munich RE Group
K. Angrishi is with Munich RE, Königinstrasse 107, 80802 Munich e-mail:
KAngrishi@munichre.com.
The author like to thank Jo Müller, Carsten Topsch, Sebastian Wolf and
Wilhelm Reeb for their time and feedback in both initiation into work on IoT
and in the preparation of this contribution
   Internet of Things
   (IoT)
Industrial Control Systems
Home Automation /
Smart Home
Medical and healthcare
Smart City
Autonomous 
Vehicles
Smart traffic & parking 
control
Smart Metering & 
Smart Grids
Fig. 1. Internet of Things (IoT)
Fig. 2. The worth of IoT by 2025
a smart phone can be seen as a computer that makes phone
calls or a refrigerator is a computer that keeps things cold.
These specialized computers are often run by powerful micro-
processors just as much as desktop, laptop or tablet computers
and are well connected with each other, either inside a private
network or over the public Internet. The crucial distinction
with these specialized computers is that, IoT devices are often
designed with poor security or even none at all. Internet is
already very complex to secure, with additional 9+ billion
insecure IoT devices, the task has become more difficult. In
the next section, a brief introduction of simplified Internet is
given to understand the vulnerabilities used by IoT botnets to
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launch attacks on clueless victims in Internet.
II. INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLIFIED INTERNET
Internet is the network of networks. It can be broadly
divided into two parts, namely, access network and core
network. There are arrays of technologies involved in enabling
the normal functioning of both access and core networks.
Since IoT devices are mostly end customer devices deployed
at edge of access networks and IoT botnets often exploit the
vulnerabilities present at the interface between access networks
and core network, we limit our discussion on internet to
access networks especially digital subscriber line (DSL) access
network (see Figure 3) along with the TCP/IP protocol suite.
The first entity on the DSL access network is DSL modem
located at the customer premises. DSL modem can terminate
ADSL, SHDSL, VDSL circuits and provide LAN interface
to end devices at private or commercial premises. Now-a-
days, most DSL modems are integrated into the home routers.
Thereby, the clear demarcation of local area network (home
network) and the infrastructure of the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) is no more possible. DSL modem is connected to a
digital subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM) port in
telephone exchange using telephone company wires. DSLAM
converts analog electrical signals from subscriber local loop to
digital data traffic (upstream traffic for data upload) and digital
data traffic to analog electrical signals to subscriber local loop
(downstream for data download). The traffic from DSLAM is
routed to and from a broadband remote access server (BRAS)
sitting at the edge of an ISP’s core network, and aggregates
user sessions from the access network. BRAS has following
specific tasks
1) Provides layer 2 connectivity through transparent bridg-
ing or Point to Point Protocol sessions over Ethernet
(PPPoE) or ATM sessions. A BRAS can terminate upto
50000 PPPoE sessions.
2) Inject policy management and Quality of Service (QoS).
3) Provides layer 3 connectivity and routes IP traffic
through the Internet Service Provider (ISP) backbone
infrastructure to the Internet.
4) Responsible for assigning network parameters such as IP
addresses to the clients. BRAS is connected to following
major necessary servers to assign network parameters to
the DSL modem:
• Authentication, authorization and accounting sys-
tems of ISP
• Auto Configuration Server (ACS) to perform remote
management of the DSL modems at the customer
premises.
• Domain Name System (DNS) server of ISP to
translate the domain name address to IP address
to enable the users to transfer data over the IP
networks.
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) server to provide
timing information to DSL modems.
• Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
server to lease unique public IP address to each DSL
modems.
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Fig. 3. The DSL access network together with core network of ISPs
BRAS is technically the first IP hop from the client to the
internet. BRAS is connected to Internet router of the ISP to
route the user traffic into the Internet. Data traffic from one ISP
is forwarded to the infrastructure of another ISP through their
respective edge routers. The main functionality of Internet is
to be used by users to transfer data from end devices over
a medium (wired or wireless) through the infrastructure of
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to either other user’s end
devices or to servers of service providers. The end user will
need the IP address of the destination to transfer the data
through the Internet, this information can be obtained by
making a domain name look-up using the services of DNS
server of the ISP to obtain the IP address. The DNS server
of ISP, if the requested domain name is not found locally,
would recursively querying the authoritative DNS hierarchy.
To illustrate the working of DNS, let’s imagine a user wants
to visit the website "www.amazon.com". The web browser first
looks in its own cache for the IP address of the domain name
"www.amazon.com", if no entry is found, the web browser
will ask the operating system (OS). If OS doesn’t have the
entry, OS will perform the DNS query to DNS servers of
ISP. The DNS servers of ISP are mostly configured to provide
recursive DNS look-up. This means, the ISP’s DNS server
will quest the "root" name server to find out which name
servers are authoritative (in simple terms responsible) for
the ".com" domain. Once the information is available, ISP’s
DNS sever will send a query to those name servers asking
them about the authoritative name server for "amazon.com"
domain and then a final query to those name servers asking
for the address of "www.amazon.com". The servers which
answer for "www.amazon.com" and resolve the domain name
to an IP address are called authoritative DNS servers. These
authoritative DNS servers can be either company’s private
DNS server or a company hires a DNS service provider like
Dyn to have managed DNS service. The figure 4 illustrates
the working of recursive DNS query processing without the
consideration of DNS caching, web-browser caching or OS
caching.
The another important component of Internet is Content
Delivery Networks (CDN). CDN operators like Akamai host
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Fig. 4. The DNS query processing
servers all over the globe and offer the service to cache
bandwidth hungry contents for the websites for some nominal
charge so that the end users can load those contents from
one of their servers closest to users. Organizations depend on
these CDNs to store and distribute contents to their customers
around the world so that customer’s servers will not be
overwhelmed by user traffic and also to enable speedy delivery
of bandwidth intensive contents to the end-users.
CDN, DNS Service providers and ISP are the key players
who offer the services marketed as Anti-DDoS or DDoS
mitigation services where the traffic are beneficially filtered
or absorb and redistribute flood of malicious traffic.
A. Protocols
When the user data travels through the Internet, it prop-
agates independent of the medium (e.g., copper wires, fiber
optics cables, mobile networks, etc) because protocols are
defined to separate from the means of communication. Pro-
tocols are high-level abstractions of network communications
which enables to abstract details of the physical medium.
Networks are built on layered communication architecture
known as protocol stack. There two primary protocol stacks
widely used in reality, namely, Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) and the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) architecture. OSI architecture has 7 layers
and TCP/IP architecture has 4 layers. TCP/IP architecture can
be seen as a simplified version of OSI architecture where
layers 1,2 and layers 5,6,7 of OSI is mapped directly to layer
1 and layer 4 of TCP/IP architecture, respectively. TCP/IP
architecture is widely used in comparison to OSI architecture
so we will restrict our discussion to TCP/IP architecture. The
layers in TCP/IP architecture, their responsibilities and the
most common protocols relevant for our discussion are listed
in the table I.
Details about each protocols listed in the table I can be
found in table II. The figure 5 illustrates the layered commu-
nication over the TCP/IP protocol stack between data sender
and receiver. Layers in the protocol stack communicate in
three directions. Each layer communicate abstractly with the
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Fig. 5. Layered communication over TCP/IP protocol stack with UDP as
transport layer protocol
layer above thereby abstracting the working of the current
layer to the layer above. Similarly, the layer communicates
less abstractly with the layer below and while the data is
communicated to parallel or across the same layer in the
protocol stack of the communicating peer. Interaction between
the above and below layers are actual interaction between the
layers, while the interaction between the parallel layers are
virtual communication. Each layer adds its own activity to
enable communication between two peers. The logical data
communication path propagates from layer 4 to layer 1 for a
sender and from layer 1 to layer 4 for a receiver. Physical
communication always occurs at the layer 1. Peer-to peer
correspondence occurs only at the like layers of sender and
receiver. For example, if the sender’s layer 3 affixes a header
to the user data, then the receiver’s layer 3 reads the header and
removers it after verification that the receiver is the intended
recipient.
III. DDOS ATTACKS AND IOT BOTNETS
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one of the
most interesting and widely seen cyber attacks in the recent
times. In DDoS attack, a hacker temporarily enslaves a number
of internet-enabled devices into an arrangement known as
botnet and then make simultaneous requests to a server or a
array of servers for a specific service, thereby overwhelming
the server and make it ignore legitimate requests from end-
users (see Fig: 6). In simple terms, imagine a group of random
people crowding up at the entrance or the shop show room
space making no room for the geniune customers to enter the
shop, thereby interrupting the business operations of the shop.
A hacker can do this for different reasons, earlier it was for
bragging rights, but now-a-days, these attacks are carried out
by organized criminals for financial gains or for revenge or
extortion or activism.
A DDoS attack can exhaust the bandwidth (communication
medium) or resources of the victim. Bandwidth can be expen-
sive for small and medium enterprise. Most servers today are
capable of serving 1Gbps, costs 50$ per month on average or a
10Gbps server costs 300$ per month on average. Exhaustion of
the bandwidth for a period of time would lead to unavailability
of the server during that time. Resources of server can be
either processing capacity, number of ports, memory (RAM or
persistent storage), processing capacity or others. Exhaustion
TURNING IOT INTO IOV : IOT BOTNETS 4
TABLE I
TCP/IP PROTOCOL LAYERS
Layers Name Responsibilities Common Protocols
4 Application User interaction, data presentation, HTTP, SOAP, FTP, Telnet, DNS, SSL/TLS, SSH, DHCP,
BGP, NTP, SNMP, TR-069
3 Transport Convert messages to packets, sequencing, integrity, flow con-
trol, end-to-end error detection and correction
TCP, UDP
2 Network Convert packets to datagrams, routing IP, ICMP, ARP, GRE (L3 tunneling protocol)
1 Physical Convert datagrams to bits, bit transmission DSL, Ethernet, Optical fiber
Hacker Customer
Service 
Provider
Fig. 6. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
of resources of the server can lead to either unavailability of
the server or also lead to undesirable state of the server during
which the cyber criminals can compromise the data in the
server. DDoS attacks are often performed by two techniques,
namely, reflection and amplification technique. In reflection
technique, the attacker sends different packets with forged IP
address of the victim / target as the source address of the
packets to different destinations, which lead to the destination
servers responding to the victim / target with the response to
the sent packets from the attacker. Reflection technique is used
by the attackers to usually hide his / her trail. In amplification
technique, the small number of packets from attackers will
elicit a large number of packets directed to the victim / target
system. Amplification technique is often combined together
with the reflection technique to lunch a large attack on to
an unsuspecting victim / target. Malformed, unrequested, or
recursive TCP, UDP, or ICMP traffic are the most common
type of traffic used in a DDoS attack. In particular, for the
reflection and amplification attacks DNS, NTP and SNMP
traffic are favored[19].
Another important aspect about DDoS attack is that the
threat actors now-a-days deploy a layered attack with mul-
tiple attack vectors to achieve their goal. Therefore, the real
intention for a DDoS attack is difficult to identify. Apart from
disrupting the daily operations, DDoS can be used to probe
the defenses of a victim / target or to just distract the victim
/ target during a actual attack using a different attack vector
or exploiting a different vulnerabilities. Verisign in its report
[20] has found that, between 1st April and 30th June 2016,
there has been 64% DDoS attacks employing multiple attack
types.
One can observe from the recent cyber incidents that the
vulnerabilities of IoT devices are most effectively utilized by
botnets to launch wide range of distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks. In [4], researchers have found that most DDoS
attacks in recent time originate from 3 types of devices, almost
96 percent were IoT devices, approximately 4 percent were
home routers and less than 1 percent were compromised Linux
servers. The IoT botnets not only affect the owners of the IoT
devices but also anyone on the internet. To understand the
IoT malwares, we need to understand the constrains posed
by the environment of IoT devices, which have the following
characteristics:
• Embedded Linux dominate the IoT landscape with wide
variety of libc implementations / version along with same
ABI-compatible Linux kernel (2.4 < x < 4.3)
• Small memory capacity (RAM)
• Limited flash capacity mostly used to store embedded OS
and firmware
• Non x86 architectures, mostly ARM, MIPS
• Support Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binaries
• Rarely has any integrated User Interface (UI)
• Networked (mostly also internet enabled)
The threats to these IoT devices are important concern
because they are hard to re-mediate and fix. IoT devices are
low hanging fruits for the bad guys. The existence of IoT
botnets has been a known fact since 2008. However, the extent
of danger posed by the them was not realized until the second
half of 2016. The key characteristics of IoT malwares used to
orchestrate DDoS attacks are the following:
• Most of the IoT malwares are Linux based malwares.
• Majority of the IoT malware has limited or no side-
effects on performance of the host. They become active
and perform DDoS on certain command from its botnet
herders.
• Many IoT malware reside on IoT devices’ temporary
memory (RAM).
• Most IoT malwares does not use reflection or ampli-
fication techniques to launch an attack, so it is much
difficult to recognize and mitigate the attack using the
conventional methods.
• Volume of traffic floods generated by IoT botnets are very
high, in the orders of 100 Gbps or higher, in comparison
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Fig. 7. DNS Water Torture Technique
to conventional PC botnets.
• The location of the infected IoT devices are distributed
all around the world (see figures 8 and 9 ).
• Apart from generating commonly used traffic floods,
namely, HTTP , TCP, UDP traffic, some IoT botnets
generates unconventional traffic like GRE traffic and use
uncommon "DNS water torture" technique during DDoS
attacks.
The use of GRE traffic flood is very unusual for DDoS
attacks especially because source of GRE traffic cannot be
forged. Most Internet routers allow GRE traffic as they are
used to generate Virtual Private Networks (VPN) connections.
GRE is also used by DDoS scrubbing providers as part of the
mitigation architecture.
The uncommon "DNS water torture" technique illustrated
in the figure 7 is different from the conventional amplification
or reflection techniques as it requires significantly less queries
to be sent by the bot, letting the ISP’s recursive DNS server
perform the attack on the target’s authoritative DNS servers.
In this technique, a well-formed DNS query containing the
target’s domain name along with a randomly generated prefix
appended to the name is sent by the bot. ISP’s DNS server
will recursively query the authoritative DNS server, if one gets
overloaded, the request is forwarded to the next authoritative
DNS server of the organization. Thereby, ISP’s DNS server
launching the attack on behalf of the IoT bot.
A. Evolution of IoT Malware
In this section, we will briefly outline the evolution of
IoT malwares responsible for DDoS attacks in the recent
times. The list of IoT botnet malwares discussed below is not
complete especially because script kiddies and cyber criminals
have been modifying and updating the known malwares to
exploit new vulnerabilities or to infect diverse types of IoT
devices.
• Linux/Hydra is the earliest known malware targeting IoT
devices. It is an open source botnet framework released in
2008. It was designed for extensibility and features both
a spreading mechanism and DDoS functionality [5], [6].
• Psyb0t was found in-the-wild targeting routers and DSL
modems in 2009. Estimated 100000 compromised de-
vices were infected by the malware. Psyb0t is operated by
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) based command-and-control
servers. The primary methods to infect IoT devices used
by Psyb0t are Telnet and SSH access using simple brute
force attack with predefined 6000 usernames and 13000
passwords. [7]
• Chuck Noris is a IRC bot found infecting routers and DSL
modems in 2010. Similar to Psyb0t, it was spreading by
brute forcing passwords but also could exploit authenti-
cation bypass vulnerability in D-Link routers [10]
• Tsunami is another IRC bot which modifies the DNS
server setting in the configuration of the infected devices
such that the traffic from IoT device is redirected to
malicious servers controlled by the attacker [6]
• LightAidra/Aidra is a IRC-based mass scanning and ex-
ploitation tool support on several architectures, namely
MIPS, MIPSEL, ARM, PPC, x86/86-64 and SuperH.
Malware is designed to search open telnet ports that
could be accessed using known default credentials [11].
The source code of LightAidra is freely available on the
Internet as open source project [8]
• Carna is a botnet created by an anonymous hacker to
measure the extent of the Internet and to get an estimation
of the IP address usage. The data was collected by
infecting Internet enabled IoT devices, especially routers
with empty or default credentials [9]. Carna usually scans
for LightAidra on infected IoT devices and attempts to
remove files and block any ports used by LightAidra
for communication. The distribution of Carna Botnet
between March 2012 to December 2012 is shown in the
figure 8
• Linux.Darlloz is termed as IoT worm by Symantec [12]
that spreads by exploiting an old PHP vulnerability to
access a system and privilege escalation through default
and common credential lists. Like LightAidra, it also
supports various architecture including x86, ARM, MIPS,
MIPSEL, PPC architectures. After infecting the device,
it drops the telnet traffic via iptables configuration and
terminates the telnetd process to block users from ac-
cessing the infected device using Telnet. Symantec found
that Darlloz has infected more than 31000 devices by
February 2014 [13]. A newer version of Darlloz uses
infected devices to mine crypto-currencies (Mincoins and
Dogecoins) [13]. Like Carna botnet, Darlloz also targets
specifically LightAidra. It attempts to remove files and
block any communication ports used by LightAidra.
• Linux.Wifatch is an open-source malware which infects
the IoT devices with weak or default credentials. Once
infected, it removes other malwares and disables tel-
net access while logging the message "Telnet has been
closed to avoid further infection of this device. Please
disable telnet, change telnet passwords, and/or update
the firmware." in the device logs. Wifatch uses peer-
to-peer network to update the malware definition and
deletes remnants of malware which remain in the IoT
devices[14].
• TheMoon is a IoT worm discovered by Johannes Ullrich
of SANS in February 2014. This malware specifically
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targets Linksys routers and exploits a command execution
vulnerability while parsing ′ttcp_ip′ parameter value sent
in a POST request. Command-and-Control servers (C2s)
of the malware is capable of using SSL for end-to-end
communication with their bots [15].
• Spike / Dofloo is a backdoor/DDoS malware discovered
around mid-2014 found targeting 32-bit and 64-bit Win-
dows, Linux based PCs as well as IoT devices based
on MIPS and ARM architectures. It has been used in
several attacks aimed at organizations in Asia and the
United States. Akamai observed that one of the attacks
to have peaked at 215Gbps [16]. This malware appears
to be developed by China based group and can launch
attacks with various payloads including SYN floods,
UDP floods, DNS query floods, and GET floods against
targeted organizations.
• BASHLITE / Lizkebab / Torlus / gafgyt is one of the
popular malware which infects Linux based IoT devices
to launch DDoS attacks. It was reported that BASH-
LITE is responsible for enslaving over 1 million IoT
devices, constituting mostly of Internet enabled cameras
and DVRs[55]. It is capable of launching attacks of up
to 400 Gbps . Most BASHLITE attacks are simple UDP,
TCP floods and HTTP attacks. BASHLITE infect a IoT
device by brute-forcing its telnet access using known
default credentials. One interesting aspect of BASHLITE
is that malware payload deployed in IoT devices has the
BASHLITE’s C2s IP addresses hard-coded into it and are
easier to monitor. Most of the infected devices are located
in Taiwan, Brazil and Columbia. The source code of
BASHLITE was partly leaked in early 2015 and has led to
many variants. BASHLITE is considered the predecessor
of Mirai and is in direct competition for vulnerable IoT
real estate.
• KTN-RM / Remaiten is a IoT Malware which combines
the features of Tsunami and BASHLITE [17]. It infects
Linux based IoT devices by brute forcing using frequently
used default usernames and passwords combinations from
a list. C2s interacts with the bots using IRC commu-
nications by an actual IRC channel. Remaiten is more
sophisticated than Tsunami and BASHLITE derivative
malware. Remaiten can adapt itself based on the IoT
device architecture and the type of attacks it wants to
launch [17].
• Mirai is one of the most predominant DDoS IoT botnet in
recent times. Mirai means "the future" in Japanese. Mirai
botnet is definitely the next step in IoT DDoS botnet mal-
wares, however not as sophisticated as Remaiten but most
effective. At its peak, Mirai infected 4000 IoT devices
per hour and currently it is estimated to have little more
than half a million infected active IoT devices. Mirai
botnet is famous for being used in the record breaking
1.1Tbps DDoS attack with 148000 IoT devices. Mirai
targets mostly CCTV cameras, DVRs, and home routers.
The source code for Mirai has been published by its
alleged author Paras Jha [70] using his online pseudonym
"Anna-senpai" on the English-language hacking commu-
nity Hackforums as open-source [3]. Since the release of
Fig. 8. Distribution of Carna Botnet between March 2012 to December 2012
(Source: [9])
the Mirai source code, the number of IoT infected devices
has increased from 213000 to 483000 in just two weeks.
Based on the IP addresses one can identify that the Mirai
infected IoT devices are distributed in over 164 countries
with highest densities in Vietnam, Brazil, US, China and
Mexico (see figure 9). The strength of the DDoS attack
ranges from 200 Gbps to 1.2 Tbps. Mirai generates floods
of GRE IP, GRE ETH, SYN and ACK, STOMP, DNS,
UDP, or HTTP traffic against a target during a DDoS
attack [56], [57]. More recently [63], Mirai has been
found to be enhanced to infect Windows devices, helping
hackers hijack even more devices. This enhanced Mirai
malware could also identify and compromise database
services like MySQL and Microsoft SQL running on
different ports to create new admin "phpminds" with the
password "phpgodwith" allowing the hackers to steal the
database. The awareness of IoT botnets in recent times
attributes to Mirai and the volume of traffic generated
during its DDoS attacks.
• Linux/IRCTelnet is a new IRC botnet ELF malware aimed
at IoT devices with IPv6 capabilities. IRCTelnet combin-
ing the concept of Tsunami for IRC protocol, BASHLITE
for the infection techniques (telnet brute force access and
code injection) and using the Mirai botnet’s IoT credential
list. The base source code of LightAidra/Aidra is used to
build the new botnet malware. The botnet is using UDP,
TCP flood along with other series of attack methods in
both IPv4 and IPv6 protocol. The new malware features
the extra IP spoof option in both IPv4 or IPv6.
B. DDoS-as-a-Service
In their report "State of Internet" (Q3 2016) [21], Akamai
has reported to have observed 138% increase (in compari-
son to 2015) in DDoS attacks with traffic greater than 100
Gbps attributing to the increase in the usage of IoT devices
in DDoS attacks and the easy availability of commercial
DDoS services or DDoS-as-a-Service (DDoSaaS) for hire.
One can anonymously order a 5-6 Gbps DDoS attack lasting
10 minutes or more for as little as $6. The DDoSaaS (also
known as "booter"’ or "stresser") providers sell the attack
capabilities for knocking websites offline or perform stress
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Fig. 9. Distribution of Mirai Botnet until 26th October 2016 (Source: [57])
tests on different network infrastructures. Recent study [26]
found over 435 booter and stresser websites on the open
Internet or Clearnet. However, there are much more offers
on the Darknet. Darknet is an overlay network accessible
using specific software, configurations and authorization which
often uses non-standard communication protocols and ports.
Darknet is often used by cyber criminals to offer their services.
Some of the marketplaces available on Darknet are HELL,
Alphabay, Valhalla, Hansa and The Real Deal among others.
There marketplaces provide one click shopping experience
for DDoSaaS, tools and personally identifiable information
(PII) lists. The cost of a DDoSaaS varies based on the size
of the botnet, type of attack, the victim or target’s defenses,
exclusivity of the malware and other factors. Two of the most
famous DDoSaaS are listed below:
• Shenron Attack Tool - provided by popular hacker group
Lizard Squad as public stresser services. Eight differ-
ent packages are available for interested customers, the
cheapest DDoS package is offered for $ 19.99 to launch a
35 Gbps attack for 20 minutes with UDP and TCP traffic.
• vDOS Attack Tool - provided by hacker group, vDOS.
It is one of the most preferred tools. Thirteen different
attack vectors available for DDoS Attack. Four differ-
ent packages are available for interested customers, the
cheapest DDoS package is offered for $19.99 to gain
access to 216 Gbps attack shared network.
In [21] Akamai observe that the DDoSaaS traffic continue to
account for a large portion of the attack traffic in major attacks.
In the next section, we describe some of the major and minor
IoT botnet (mostly Mirai) DDoS incidents in recent times to
indicate the seriousness of the current situation.
C. Recent Famous DDoS Incidents by IoT Botnets
1) KrebsOnSecurity.com: On the evening of 30th Septem-
ber 2016, the blog of the security researcher, Brain Krebs,
experienced a 623Gbps DDoS attack from a large number of
compromised IoT devices[22]. This particular DDoS attack
was considered to be a retaliation action from a group of
hackers due to Krebs’ series of articles on the take down of
the Israeli DDoS-as-a-Service provider called vDOS, which
coincided with the arrests of two 18 years old men named
in those articles as the founders of the service [23]. Krebs
was a pro bono customer of Akamai, a leading CDN operator
which hosted his blog website and also provided the DDoS
attack protection. After resisting the attack for three days as
the DDoS mitigation efforts were beginning to cause problems
to Akamai’s paying customers, Akamai terminated their pro
bono contract with Krebs. The DDoS attack was so aggressive
that the Akamai platform couldn’t handle the resources needed
to mitigate the attack as it is nearly twice the size of the next-
largest attack they had ever seen before [24]. Had Akamai
continued their free support, they will have to spend millions
of dollars in cyber-security services. Akamai observed in their
report [21] that they have seen 5 different DDoS attacks on
the blog in September 2016 alone ranging from 123 Gbps to
623 Gbps and see these DDoS attacks as the means used by
cyber criminals to silence their detractors. After the abrupt
termination of pro bono agreement with Akamai, traffic des-
tined for the blog was redirected to 127.0.0.1 âA˘Tˇ effectively
relegating all traffic destined for KrebsOnSecurity.com into a
giant black hole. The blog is back online with the support of
Project Shield, a free service run by Google to help protect
news sites and free expression from online censorship through
DDoS attacks.
According to the Akamai’s Q3 2016 State of the Internet
report [21], the DDoS attack was launched by just 24000 IoT
devices from around the world, mostly constituting digital
video recorders (DVR) and IP cameras that are exposed to
Internet. The 623 Gbps DDoS attack was launched with the
help of IoT devices infected with Mirai and BASHLITE
malware [22]. The attack traffic was mostly of GRE traffic
and junk web traffic such as SYN, GET and POST floods from
legitimate connections between attacking host and target.
2) OVH: OVH is french cloud computing and hosting
company that offers virtual private servers (VPS), dedicated
servers and other web services. On 22rd September 2016,
OVH founder and CTO Octave Klaba posted the message
along with a screen-shot on his twitter account explaining that
OVH servers are experiencing a series of DDoS attacks and
many of them larger than 100 Gbps, with the severest single
attack documented by OVH reached 799 Gbps [25]. Later
on 23rd September 2016, Klaba posted again on his twitter
account that OVH has experienced a record breaking DDoS
attack generating at least 1.1 Tbps to 1.5 Tbps traffic from
145607 camera / DVR with each IoT device sending traffic
between 1-30 Mbps. The attack is suspected to be from IoT
devices infected with Mirai and BASHLITE malware sending
traffic mostly of type TCP/Ack, TCP/Ack+PSH and TCP/SYN
[25]. There was no reason given for OVH attack, however
it is the largest DDoS attack launched so far. The hacker
with pseudonym "Anna-senpai", who released Mirai botnet
malware source code claims to have lived in France during
the OVH attack and was avoiding law enforcement authorities
for his involvement in DDoS attack on KrebsOnSecurity.com.
3) Dyn: Dyn is an Internet performance management com-
pany offering wide range of products to monitor, control
and optimize online infrastructure. Dyn is also one of the
leading managed DNS provider in the world. On 21st October
2016, Dyn experienced DDoS attacks on their managed DNS
servers from 100000 Internet enabled IoT devices such as
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Fig. 10. Largest DDoS attack each year
printers, IP cameras, residential gateways and baby monitors
that generated masked TCP and UDP traffic over port 53.
IoT devices used in the attack are found to be primarily
infected by Mirai botnet malware [28]. According to some
experts, the attack magnitude reached in the 1.2 Tbps range
but there has been no confirmation from Dyn [28]. The attack
has been analyzed as a complex and sophisticated attack
that generated, apart from the masked TCP and UDP traffic
floods, also compounding recursive DNS retry traffic which
further amplified the impact of the attack. i.e., after the attack,
Dyn DNS servers experienced further 10-20 times the typical
amount of legitimate traffic from millions of IP addresses
because the multiple DNS requests has been generated by
recursive DNS servers from the user retries to access websites.
The DDoS attack itself was launched at two different time
intervals, first attack begun at 11:10 UTC to 13:20 UTC
and then again from 15:50 UTC to 17:00 UTC. The first
attack began at 11:10 UTC at the managed DNS platform of
Dyn in Asia Pacific, South America, Eastern Europe and US-
West regions which triggered a response from Dyn to initiate
their incident response protocols. Dyn observed that the attack
abruptly changed its target to their point of presence (POP) in
the US-East region. Dyn’s engineering and network operations
team started to deploy additional mitigation mechanisms like
traffic shaping, re-balancing of incoming traffic by tuning the
anycast policies, internal traffic filtering and deployment of
scrubbing services. The attack subsided by 13:20 UTC either
because of Dyn’s mitigation efforts or the attacker intended
it so is not clear. A second wave of attack on Managed
DNS platform started again at 15:50 UTC from more globally
distributed IoT devices, however the mitigation mechanism
already set in place due to first wave of attacks could be
extended for the second attack and Dyn could substantially
recover by 17:00 UTC. The residual impact from additional
sources was observed until 20:30 UTC. Dyn reported to have
observed a number of probing smaller TCP attacks during the
next several hours and days after the two waves of DDoS
attack.
Dyn provide their Managed DNS service to some of the
famous websites like, Airbnb, Amazon.com. Reddit, Spotify
and many others who were partly or completely unavailable to
large swathes of users in Europe and North America. The im-
Fig. 11. Depiction of the outage caused in US by Dyn DDoS attack
pact of the outage due to DDoS attack on Dyn is illustrated in
the figure 11. According to Datanyze, leading techno-graphics
provider which does analysis of Managed DNS market share,
Dyn was the most favored Managed DNS provider offering
their service 137 out 1000 top Alexa websites in 2015 but
after the DDoS attack they now offer their service to only 90
out 1000 top Alexa websites and lost many customers to their
main competitor Cloudflare DNS and Amazon Route 53 who
market their service as Managed Cloud DNS service.
The motivation behind the Dyn DDoS attack is not very
clear. However, Brain Krebs notes in his blog [29] that just
hours before the Dyn attack, Doug Madory, a researcher
working for Dyn, made a presentation to North American
Network Operators Group (NANOG), based on a joint re-
search with Krebs, about a dubious DDoS mitigation company
called BackConnect. Madory indicated that BackConnect may
have contacts with cybercriminal and uses non-ethical methods
like BGP hijack to perform DDoS mitigation. There is no
conclusive evidence for the claim of Krebs. Regardless of the
reason, the Dyn incident made people to take notice of IoT
botnets and DDoS attacks. It also inspired many discussion in
cybersecurity and legislative communities.
4) Deutsche Telekom: Deutsche Telekom is a german
telecommunication company having strong presence in Europe
and US. They are one of the most favored Internet service
provider in Germany. Deutsche Telekom provide their DSL
subscribers a home routers with in-built DSL modem, manu-
factured by different companies, under the brand name "Speed-
port". On Sunday, 27th November 2016, a large number of
Deutsche Telekom customers reported connectivity problems.
These issues were traced to particular models of "Speedport"
home routers, namely, Speedport W 921V, Speedport W 723V
Typ B, Speedport W 921 Fiber manufactured by Taiwanese
manufacturer Arcadyan. The root cause of the problem was
found to be the new Mirai malware variant which was trying
to actively scan and infect the vulnerable devices to expand the
number of infected devices in their botnet. The vulnerability
intended to be exploited by these new Mirai malware variant
was reported by a security researcher "kenzo2007" on his blog
dated 7th November 2016. In his blog entry [31], "kenzo2017"
showed that TR069/TR064 was not properly implemented
in D1000 modem manufactured by Zyxel and used by Irish
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ISP Eir. Interestingly, Taiwanese manufacturer Arcadyan who
produced vulnerable "Speedport" home router for Deutsche
Telekom, appears to be not connected to Zyxel, the makers of
the vulnerable Eir modem.
There are three different vulnerabilities exploited by the new
Mirai malware variants.
1) Most ISP leave the port 7547 open on ISP supplied home
router / modem for remote management of CPE using
TR069 (CPE WAN Management Protocol). Though, this
is not a huge flaw, it is not recommended as anyone can
access CPE (router/modem) using the port 7547. The
authentication method used by TR069 either requires
no passwords or use weak HTTP digest authentication
method over unencrypted path or using certificate au-
thentication, which is in most cases not implemented
properly by the manufacturers. This issue was first
pointed out by security researcher Luka Perkov in his
talk "ISP Black Box" at 28C3 and more recently by
Shahar Tal in his talk " I Hunt TR-069 Admins: Pwning
ISPs Like a Boss" at DEFCON 22. A simple search
on Shodan (www.shodan.io) shows approximately 41
million devices have their port 7547 open.
2) TR064 ( LAN-Side DSL CPE Configuration) Server was
running behind the port 7547 meant for TR069. TR064
strictly meant for local configuration of CPE but not
for remote management. This flaw allows anyone on
Internet to access CPE (Router/Modems) and perform
important device (CPE) configurations.
3) The crucial flaw in these specific models of CPE is
that "SetNTPServer" command of TR064 can be used
to execute arbitrary commands (command injection vul-
nerability).
In [32] Comsecuris, a security company, ran some tests on
one of the "Speedport" modems and found it is not vulnerable,
but they did observe that the modem became slow or non-
functional even under moderate load, so it is possible that
even-though the new Mirai malware variant was not success-
ful, it caused the modem to crash. Mira IoT malware resides on
temporary memory (RAM) of IoT devices, therefore a simple
power reset can remove the malware from the infected IoT
devices. However, many IoT botnet herders constantly scan
the internet for vulnerable Internet enabled IoT devices. As per
SANS, a non-profit security institution, the new Mirai variant
was continuously scanning the Internet for new vulnerable
devices and could find any newly connected router/modem
within 10 minutes. Tests done by security researcher Darren
Martyn show that modems used by UK ISP TalkTalk, D-Link
DSL 3780 modems, modems made by MitraStar, Digicom and
Aztech are all vulnerable. He states that he found 48 different
vulnerable devices in use now. Deutsche Telekom informs that
the incident affected 900000 home routers, which is 1 in 20
customers of Deutsche Telekom in Germany. Similar incident
has been reported by UK ISPs TalkTalk and UK Post Office’s
Internet broadband service affecting over 100,000 customers.
Deutsche Telekom and other UK ISPs were able to fix the
security problems in vulnerable devices by providing firmware
update. The impact of the outage in Germany due to the attack
Fig. 12. Depiction of the outage caused in Germany by Mirai attack on
Deutsche Telekom Customers
by new Mirai variant on vulnerable "Speedport" home routers
is illustrated in the figure 12.
D. Other Notable Minor IoT Incidents
Since the beginning of 2013, there has been many minor
DDoS attacks by different IoT botnets. In the wake of the
DDoS attack on Dyn, MalwareTech.com has set up a auto-
mated twitter account (@MiraiAttacks) that live tweets the
information from their honeypot system, which includes the
information about the botnet used, type of traffic, duration of
the attack, target IP and port addresses. At the time of this
article, there are 79 different botnets being monitored by the
account [30]. However, in this section we discuss some of the
most interesting minor incidents happened in recent times.
1) CCTV vs Small Business Websites: Sometime in June
2016, web security firm, Sucuri was contacted by a small
jewelery shop to help them mitigate a DDoS attack their
website was experiencing. They observed the website was
under DDoS attack peaked at nearly 50000 HTTP requests
per second and lasted for days. They could mitigate the attack
swiftly by moving their DNS to Sucuri servers and soon
realized that jewelery shop website was not the only one
under attack, but thousands of websites were under DDoS
attack by 25000+ compromised CCTV devices located all
around the world. Researchers has observed 25000 unique IP
addresses from locations like Taiwan, US, Indonesia, Mexico
and Malaysia. The most interesting aspect of this attack is that
5% of the IPs observed are IPv6 [33].
2) Liberia: In early November, Mirai IoT botnet attack on
telecommunication infrastructure of Liberia was observed by
@MiraiAttacks twitter account. This led to the speculation
that Internet in Liberia was brought down by Mirai [34].
The Internet undersea cable to Liberia installed in 2011 was
claimed by Beaumont as single point of failure for Internet
access in Liberia [35]. The speculation of the possibility of
Mirai botnet knocking the Internet access to Liberia was
further fueled by the claim of a security researcher reported
from anonymous sources that an attack of 500 Gbps had
targeted Liberia’s undersea Internet cable. This coincided
with network connectivity problems observed by the users
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in Liberia. The general manager of the Cable Consortium
of Liberia reported that the African-Coast-to-Europe (ACE)
submarine cable monitoring system and the servers locally
located in Liberia Internet Exchange Point (LIXP) show no
downtime during the time attack was reported. However,
Kpetermeni Siakor, who manages the infrastructure at the
LIXP, informed that Lonestar Cell MTN, one of the four major
telecommunication companies, faced 500 Gbps DDoS attack
for a short period but was successfully mitigated.
3) Lappeenranta, Finland: Two housing blocks in
Lappeenranta, Finland experienced disruption of heating
distribution between late October to 3rd November 2016.
This incident is of particular interest as the disruption was
attributed to DDoS attack by Mirai botnet [38], [39]. Though
media outlets find the story of Finlands residents stranded
in the cold of winter due to a malicious DDoS attack by
Mirai on the remote systems, manufactured by Fidelex,
controlling the central heating and hot water distribution is an
enticing story but the truth may be different. This incident is
similar to previously mentioned Deutsche Telekom incident,
however the vulnerability exploited here is different and
simple. The security of these building automation systems
were ignored or neglected and were not behind any network
firewall or other perimeter security. Fidelex confirmed that
the vulnerabilities in the system are opened up when the
operators configured the devices for convenience [38]. The
new IoT botnet malwares actively scanning the Internet for
vulnerable IoT devices could easily reach them. In an attempt
to mitigate the attack, the system automatically reboot the
main control and got caught in an infinite restart loop that
eventually led to the heating system being offline for more
than a week [38], [39]. According to Valtia, a Lappeenranta
based facilities management company, managing these remote
heating system observe that over 90 percent of these remote
systems in terraced house or large building in the area
were built to be fail-safe, meaning if an error occurs these
systems would shutdown the heating system and attempt to
automatically reboot. The remote systems will also not send
alarm if the heating system is switched off or radiator pressure
just disappear. Valtia finally identified the malfunctioning
systems and switched the heating system to manual control,
installed firewall to limit and filter the traffic and bought
the control systems back online[39]. Though there is no
evidence for the involvement of Mirai botnet malware in
this incident, the threat posed by the IoT botnet malware to
critical infrastructure is very real and can physically affect
people.
4) Russian Banks: In October 2015, eight different Russian
financial institutions were targeted in a DDoS campaign to
inflict significant impact on Russian economy. More recently,
at least five Russian banks including Sberbank, Alfa bank, the
Moscow Exchange, the Bank of Moscow and Rosbank expe-
rienced prolong DDoS attack between 8th November to 10th
November 2016 from 24000 IoT devices distributed around
30 countries [46], [47], [48]. Though the banks never public
acknowledged the impact of these attacks, one journalist who
actively monitors their websites could not reach their websites
during the attack duration [46], [47]. A DDoS-as-a-Service
(DDoSaaS) operator "vimproducts", claims to have conducted
those attacks for his/her clients in retaliation for Russia’s
alleged involvement in US elections. "vimproducts" offers
his/her DDoSaaS offer in different qualities on Alphabay to
interested buyers.
5) US Elections: Flashpoint, Internet security company,
reported three different incidents DDoS attack on campaign
website of Donald Trump at 16:20 UTC on 6th November
2016, 8:13 UTC and 8:19 UTC on 7th November 2016. In the
last instance, the attack was also targeted the site of Hillary
Clinton. However, no outages were reported for either website.
In all the three instances a 30 second HTTP application layer
attack was launched using Mirai botnet. Flashpoint believe
that each of these attacks may have been carried out by two
different groups [41].
Another DDoS incident related to US elections reported
to have occurred on 6th November 2016, targeted a phone
bank service, TCN, used by election campaigns. The attack
begun with with a small flood of junk traffic from a small
pool of IP addresses, but soon progressively increased until
all 4 of 1 Gbps connections of TCN got saturated. The
attacker continued the DDoS attack for 24 hours, varying
the IP sources and type of traffic flood generated [42]. A
4chan user using the nickname "Sparky", claimed to have
launched these DDoS attacks against the Clinton campaign
phone lines. However, these attacks influence both Republican
as well as Democrats campaigns. The attack overwhelmed
TCN’s infrastructure and periodically took their web-based
software offline. TCN responded by procuring anti-DDoS
protection from CloudFlare, which filtered the attack traffic
and deploying a number of proxy servers designed to absorb
excess traffic [42].
6) WikiLeaks: On 7th November 2016, the email publi-
cation servers of Wikileaks were knocked offline by DDoS
attack lasting for nearly 24 hours. The attack was allegedly
in response to the "DNSLeak2" where 8263 emails from
the compromised account of John Podesta, chairman of the
Clinton campaign was released [43], [44]. Regardless of the
political motivations or correctness of the actions of Wikileaks,
this incident shows that DDoS attacks are now-a-days often
used as means to restrict the freedom of speech on the Internet.
Google has started an initiative called Project Shield which
provide free anti-DDoD services to websites that have "media,
elections, and human rights related content". KrebsonSecu-
rity.com is also one of the beneficiaries of this initiative.
7) Random Denial of Server (RDoS): In an RDoS attack,
the cyber criminals send a letter or email threatening to attack
an organization either by causing interruption to business,
operation or cyber presence, unless a ransom is paid with a
deadline. In a recent study [27], one in seven say they have has
a ransom attacks in the past year. There are many Armada Col-
lective and Lizard Squad impersonators send ransom emails
and made use of DDoSaaS to send out some warning shots to
make their demands fulfilled favorably. These impersonators
have reportedly earned $100000 with the wave of ransom
letters [27].
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Fig. 13. Generic structure of an IoT botnet
E. Anatomy of IoT Botnets
In this section we will analyze the structure of IoT bot-
nets and the mode of operations based on the publicly re-
leased source code of IoT botnet malwares, namely, Ligh-
tAidra/Aidra, BASHLITE and Mirai as well as based on the
information from the collective reverse engineering efforts
made by many security researchers [57], [61], [62], [4]. The
code of IoT malware are mostly written in C language. For
example, BASHLITE has been written in C language. Mirai
botnet uses both C and Google Go language. LightAidra/Aidra
uses Python along with the C language. The source code for
the bots is cross-compiled for multiple architectures running
the Linux operating system which is common operating system
among most of the IoT devices and embedded systems. The
generic structure of the IoT botnet is illustrated in the figure
13.
The IoT botnets consists mostly of the two basic and four
additional components, namely,
1) Bots or agents or the end zombie IoT devices that
perform DDoS attacks on command
2) Command-and-control servers (C2s) are used to control
the bots
3) Scanners are used to scan for vulnerable IoT devices.
4) Reporting server used to collect the results or scan
reports from bots or external scanner
5) Loaders used to log on to vulnerable IoT devices and
instruct them to download malware
6) Malware distribution server is the location where mal-
ware code is stored to be downloaded by infected IoT
devices
The functions of one or the other components listed above can
be combined and its function can be performed by another
component. For example, in Mirai, there exists no separate
scanner component, however the bots perform the function of
scanning for vulnerable IoT devices and also carry out DDoS
attacks on target. In a general scenario, C2s communicate
regularly with bots, foot solders in botnet. Most botnets
implements a standard client/server architecture where the bots
get their commands from the C2s or controllers. The botnet
malware spread to new IoT devices by continuously scanning
the internet for vulnerable IoT devices, either from the bots
or from an external scanners (in some cases, C2s performs
the scan directly). Potential victims devices can be found
using special search engines such as Shodan (www.shodan.io)
and Censys (www.censys.io). Reporting server receives one-
way traffic with information about the IP addresses and
credentials of the vulnerable IoT devices from scanners (as
in BASHLITE) or from the bots (as in Mirai malware).
Most IoT devices have telnet and web interface enabled
with default credentials for allowing the end users to access
these devices. In most cases, the end users don’t change the
default credentials of the IoT devices. Unfortunately, these
services with default passwords are the first point of access for
IoT malwares. Loaders uses the information sent to reporting
server by scanners to log on to the vulnerable IoT devices
with the reported credentials. Most of the IoT malware uses
the telnet connection to communicate with the vulnerable
IoT devices. Once the loaders accesses the IoT devices, it
instructs the devices to download the malware from a malware
distribution server. Most of them use the command "wget"
to download the malware binary. In the case of Remaiten,
loaders can analyze the hardware architecture of the IoT device
and download the necessary malware components to infect
the device. After downloading, the execution of the malware
binary enables the IoT devices to come under the control of
the botnet herder. The botnet herder interacts with the C2s and
reporting server for the duration of botnet lifetime. After the
establishment of botnet, it may be sold to various users who
may use an API hosted on C2s to perform DDoS attack. The
botnet author may use TOR (anonymity network) to hide his
source IP address. The some cases as in BASHLITE, malware
in the bot may have hard-coded IP addresses of the C2s. In
the case of Mirai, bot malware uses domain name to resolve
the IP address of the C2s on the fly, that way IP address of
C2s can be changed regularly to evade detection.
To summarize, the common mode of operation for most IoT
botnets are as follows:
1) Malware (external scanner or bots or C2s) continuously
scans the internet for vulnerable IoT devices, usually for
open Telnet ports or other open services reachable over
Internet
2) Once a vulnerable IoT device is found, malware (exter-
nal scanner or bots or C2s) access the vulnerable IoT
devices using brute forcing with list of known default
credentials
3) The device IP address along with the successful pass-
word are stored in a reporting server to be used by
malware (loaders or C2s) to access the device later
4) Malware (loaders or C2s) accesses the scanned IoT
device with the credentials stored in reporting server. It
exploits known security weaknesses in available services
on the IoT devices to download additional malware
payload from a malware distribution server.
5) Bot malware becomes active by the execution of the
downloaded malware binary. It escalates privilege by
exploiting the known security weaknesses in IoT devices
6) Bot malware secures the IoT devices by fixing the
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vulnerabilities used to access the device so that no other
malware can access the same IoT device
7) Competing malware, if found in the IoT devices, are
eradicated by bot malware using different techniques
like memory scraping among others
8) Bot malware reconfigures the device to be part of the
botnet
9) Bots communicate regularly with their C2s using IRC
based protocol to indicate their existence to the botnet
operator
10) Malware in bots remain dormant and doesnâA˘Z´t notice-
ably affect IoT device performance or functioning, until
a user or botnet owner instructs them perform a DDoS
attack
IoT malwares are becoming increasingly adaptive and so-
phisticated with many new features like IPv6 support, so-
phisticated communication methods between bots and C2s.
The IoT landscape is also growing large with the decision
of many consumer electronic manufacturers to produce more
Internet enabled consumer electronics. The fight for domi-
nance amongst different IoT malwares for the IoT real estate
is a commonly observed characteristics of IoT malwares, for
example, Carna, Darlloz and Wifatch removed LightAidra,
Mirai removed BASHLITE and little known Anime malware.
This aggressive behavior is to maximize the attack potential
of the botnet devices and to prevent similar removal attempts
from other malwares.
IV. REMEDIATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In a recent studies [45], HP found 70% of the IoT devices
to be vulnerable. The root cause for the vulnerabilities in IoT
devices is the rush to bring new products and services to
market by third party vendors. Moreover, these devices are
produced in offshore with very low price margin (see Figure
14), forcing manufacturers to concentrate on the functionality
than the necessary security. Many IoT device manufacturers
ignore providing security updates during the device life cycle.
Most of the devices have limited or no means to be patched
to fix known security bugs. Some of them even have hard-
corded default user credentials, like in the case of DVRs
and IP cameras made by a Chinese hi-tech company called
"XiongMai Technologies" [66]. The vulnerability in these
devices will exist until they are thrown away and that will
take a while. The life time for a IoT device varies but on an
average longer than five years. For example, on an average a
smart phone is replaced every 18 month, DVR lasts for 5 years,
a car for 10 years, a refrigerator for 25 years, a thermostat
will almost never be replaced in one’s lifetime. Therefore the
security issues seen in existing IoT devices will not disappear
in near future. The improvements in IoT security will have
happen only when the IoT device manufacturers and end-users
share responsibility of reducing risks.
Some ideas to mandate IoT devices manufacturers and
vendors to comply with several security measures like the
following:
• Hard-code the devices to limit communication to private
IPv4 address (RFC 1918) or website of the manufacturer.
Communication with all other IP or domains should be
limited.
• Each IoT device should have an unique default password
comprising of 10 or more characters with capital or small
alphabets, numbers and special characters.
• By default, Internet enabled IoT devices should be re-
quired to connect to manufacturer’s or vendor’s website
periodically to check for security updates. The functional-
ity of the IoT device shall be reduced to bare minimum if
the IoT devices doesnâA˘Z´t connect to the manufacturer’s
website for a given period of time.
• End-user should activate the device with the manufac-
turer’s or vendor’s website by providing necessary user
information like contact name, email address and other
contact information. If the device doesn’t contact the
manufacturer’s or vendor’s website, they can inform the
end-user using the provided contact information.
• Laws should be put in place to ensure that the manufac-
turers be held accountable for following and implement-
ing security best practices in their devices.
• End-users can protect themselves from participating in a
DDoS attack through the procession of infected IoT de-
vices by following some best practices (listed in Section
IV-A).
• Commercial companies who want to protect themselves
from being a victim of DDoS attacks can buy DDoS
mitigation services offered by ISPs and CDNs like Dyn,
Akamai and others.
• Apart from implementing the best practices listed in
Section IV-A, commercial companies should develop ac-
tionable and practiced incident response plans or standard
operating procedure (SOP) for their employees to flow in
the event of DDoS attack.
• ISPs can be helpful in mitigating the risk of DDoS at-
tacks by implementing Best Currect Practice 38 (BCP38)
[67] proposed by Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF).
BCP38 basically mandates that the packets with the
source IP address different from the assigned address
space of its originating network should be filtered out
at the network ingress. This would have an immediate
impact on many DDoS attacks employing reflection tech-
niques but unfortunately, it is not widely implemented by
ISPs.
• IoT device certification for security by national or in-
ternational regulatory bodies can help promote security
awareness to device manufacturers, vendors and end-
users.
• Insurance, especially cyber insurance shall be made
mandatory for commercial and private users of IoT de-
vices to their cover 1st and 3rd party liabilities. This can
be a vital tool in reducing or managing their cyber risk.
A. Best Practices
In this section, we will discuss some mitigation steps and
best practices for protection against IoT malware for the end-
users. Soon after major DDoS attacks in October 2016, US-
CERT of US Department of Homeland Security issued an
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Fig. 14. The average cost of IoT sensors
Alert (TA16-288A) regarding the DDoS threat posed by Mirai
and other IoT botnets [65]. They proposed different mitigation
and preventive steps to protect end-users from IoT malware
infection to their Internet enabled devices.
The mitigation steps for the end-users after the IoT malware
infection are as follows:
1) Disconnect the device from the Internet.
2) Reboot the device, as most IoT malware exists in tempo-
rary memory (RAM) and a reboot will clear the device
from IoT malware.
3) Ensure the default password is changed to a strong
password to avoid re-infection by the IoT malware.
4) Update the firmware, if available. Many manufacturers
of vulnerable devices provide security patches after an
array of DDoS attacks in Q3 of 2016.
5) Reconnect to the network.
In order to prevent a IoT malware infection, end-users of
the IoT devices shall follow the best practices listed below:
• Change the default password to strong password. Most
IoT malwares use default credentials to perform brute
force attack to gain telnet access to the devices.
• Always update the IoT devices with security patches
provided by their manufacturers as soon as they are
available.
• Disable all ports and services on IoT devices which are
not used.
• Diable Universal Plug and Play on routers unless it is
absolutely necessary
• Isolate the IoT devices on their own protected network
using firewalls or using different network segmentation
techniques. DonâA˘Z´t allow unnecessary Internet access
to IoT devices.
• Purchase IoT devices from reputed manufacturers with
good track record for producing secure devices or re-
sponding with regular security updates.
• Periodically monitor the Internet firewall logs for
anomaly or suspicious traffic. especially look for suspi-
cious traffic on ports 2323 (telnet traffic) and 23/TCP
(telnet traffic)
• End-user should be aware of the capabilities and appli-
cation of the IoT devices installed.
B. Cyber insurance
According to the Federal Office for Information Security,
cyber security problems cost the german economy about 45-
50 million euros per year. IT head of Volkswagen, Martin
Hofmann, said in Auguest 2016 that Volkswagen had to
handle 6000 cyber attacks a week. DDoS using IoT devices
is becoming a growing menace and can affect anyone on
the Internet including end-users, device manufacturers and
vendors. In addition to deploying security controls to safeguard
and mitigate risks from DDoS attacks by IoT botnets, one can
consider having cyber insurance additionally to compensate
economic losses incurred by any cyber incidents. Cyber in-
surance is an important tool for corporate and private user to
manage and reduce cyber risks to their vital assets.
The actors in a cyber incident are listed below:
1) Attacker - initiator of DDoS or other cyber attacks.
2) Device manufacturers - producers of vulnerable IoT
devices
3) Consumer - owner / end user of the IoT devices
4) Target - victim of the DDoS attack, who incurs losses
of any kind due to the DDoS attack
5) IT service provider - provides services in pre- and post
cyber incidents
6) Insurance company - provides different types of insur-
ance to help its customers manage and reduce cyber
risks.
The relationship between different actors in a cyber incident
is depicted the in the figure 15. The key observation is that the
insurance company and IT service provider share the similar
relationship with the consumers and target. The roles of an
IT service provider and an insurance company in relation to
consumer and target are overlapping and need a closer co-
operation with each other. In fact the services offered by
an insurance company is much more elaborate and includes
interfacing with IT service provider for risk assessment, IT
forensics for claims management. The important question
for the consumers and targets is that, if they can trust the
IT service providers of their choice. There has been many
instances in the past where an IT service provider have
installed backdoor on their client’s devices for convenience
of maintenance or for malicious activities. For example, many
famous cyber criminal groups like Lizardsquad, Poodle Corp,
vDOS offer IT services for testing the network infrastructure
and also provide DDoSaaS for criminal activities. DDoS
mitigation company, BackConnect provide DDoS mitigation
services using very non-ethical technical means like BGP
hijacking. Similarly, Paras Jha (the alleged author of Mirai
botnet malware) was offering DDoS mitigation services using
his company ProTraf Solutions [70]. Therefore, it is often
advisable for the consumers (and the target) to work closely
with the insurance company and use the services of the IT
service provider recommended by the insurance company.
Close collaboration between consumers (and the target) and
the insurance company can lead to a symbiosis relationship,
where both the consumers (and the target) and insurance
company will benefit. The recommendation from the insurance
company can enhance the trust of the consumer on the IT
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Fig. 15. Relationship between different actors involved in DDoS using IoT
devices
service provider. The insurance company can use the risk
assessment by the IT service provider to make meaningful
cyber insurance coverage to the consumers (and the target).
Crisis management, IT forensics, data recovery and system
hardening services offered by the IT service provider to a
target after a cyber incident will be made available faster and
more reliable in accordance with the insurance coverage by
the insurance company.
Insurance can be interesting for device manufacturers, con-
sumers and targets. Cyber insurance mostly offers following
coverage elements:
1) Loss or theft of data coverage (1st party)
2) Confidentiality breach liability coverage (3rd party)
3) Privacy breach protection coverage (1st party)
4) Privacy liability coverage (3rd party)
5) Payment card industry data security standard (PCI-DSS)
coverage (1st party)
6) Business interruption coverage (1st party)
7) Cyber extortion coverage (1st party)
8) Network security liability coverage (3rd party)
9) Reputational risk coverage (1st party)
with the exclusions for claims and damages for
1) physical injury to tangible property (1st party with the
exception of electronic data and 3rd party)
2) bodily injury (1st and 3rd party)
3) product recalls (1st party), including damage to property
containing an allegedly defective product (3rd party)
Cyber insurance is not a solution for everything related to
cyber incidents. It can be observed that the sort of liability
exposures listed in the exclusions may be precisely the types
of losses caused by a cyber attack made through the IoT. The
short comings of the cyber coverage can be often addressed
by negotiation with insurers during the placement process or
by existing coverage under other lines of insurance, like gen-
eral liability, first-party property and specialty lines coverage.
However, it should be noted that there are some scenarios like
outage of external networks (due to failure of power supply,
telecommunication network, Internet infrastructure or others)
influencing the business of the insured cannot be covered by
cyber insurance.
For consumers and DDoS targets, cyber insurance covers
almost all non-damage scenarios, including the costs related
to crisis consulting, crisis management, notification costs, call
center, credit monitoring, legal consulting, claims handling,
public relations and IT services, like IT forensics, data foren-
sics (including accounting). However, the device manufactur-
ers would additionally need the following insurances, namely,
1) Technology errors and omissions insurance (tech E&O)
- to cover 3rd party claims made by clients for inade-
quate work or negligent action in providing technology
services or products
2) Product liability insurance - to cover 3rd party claims
due to damage to property containing an allegedly
defective product
3) product recall insurance - to cover 1st party claims due
to product recalls
For example, DVRs with hardcoded credentials manufactured
by Chinese manufacturer XiongMai Technologies Technology
which was used in massive DDoS attack on Dyn, was recalled
in October [69]. On 5 January 2017, Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) decided to sue D-Link, a Taiwanese manufacturer
of networking equipments, for failing to take reasonable steps
to secure their routers and IP cameras [68].
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Internet has become ubiquitous and essential part of
our lives. It has enable easy communication, more efficiency
at work, connected enhanced living and accelerated inno-
vation. At the same time, Internet has also increased the
ease, viability and efficiency of launching a large scale DDoS
attacks, especially using IoT devices. In 2002, the highest
DDoS attack was 100 Mbps but in 2016, the highest DDoS
attack is in the order of 1.1-1.5Tbps. Even though there are
several peaks in the bandwidths of DDoS attacks, the average
follows Moore’s law (doubles every 12-24 months) which
is in line with other technical developments such as CPU
and storage sizes. Free availability of source code of IoT
botnets like LightAidra, BASHLITE and Mirai has led to flood
of many miscreants and script kiddies trying their hand at
IoT malwares. Especially, IoT malware Mirai has inspired a
renaissance in IoT malwares and responsible for large scale
DDoS attacks for example two DDoS attacks in the order
of 1.1 Tbps within a very short period of time. IoT botnet
has exposed the absence of basic security in IoT devices
and ignorance of best practices among IoT users. The lack
of control over IoT device manufacturers, lack of security
by design in the Internet and IoT infrastructure did not help
much in the combat against IoT malwares. IoT botnets are
evolving in sophistication and impact. If left un-checked, it can
soon inflict serious impacts on critical infrastructure systems.
The CDNs, DNS and ISP play an very important role to
stymie DDoS by IoT botnets. The capability of the bots can
be reduced by the combined efforts of device manufacturers,
legislators, regulators and end-users to implement and follow
basic cybersecurity and cyber-hygiene guidelines. The device
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manufacturers, end-users should consider cyber insurance or
other lines of insurance (especially for device manufacturers)
to manage and reduce cyber risks posed to their vital assets.
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TABLE II
LIST OF RELEVANT TCP/IP PROTOCOLS
Protocol Full Name Functionality
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP is an application layer protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information
systems. HTTP is the foundation of data communication for the World Wide Web.
TR-069 Technical Report 069 TR-069 is a technical specification that defines an application layer protocol for remote
management of end-user devices. It was published by the Broadband Forum and entitled
CPE WAN Management Protocol (CWMP)
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol SOAP is an application layer protocol for exchanging structured information between client
and web services using Extensible Markup Language (XML).
FTP File Transfer Protocol FTP is an application layer protocol used for transfer of files between a client and server
on a IP based network.
Telnet Telnet Telnet is an application layer protocol used for bidirectional interactive text-oriented
communication over the IP based network.
DNS Domain Name System The Domain Name System is a hierarchical decentralized naming system for any devices
connected to Internet or Intranet. DNS used by any network enabled devices to translate
commonly used domain names of the destination server into their corresponding IP address
to enable communication on a IP based networks. As a worldwide directory service, DNS
is important for the normal functioning of Internet.
SSL Secure Socket Layer Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is application layer cryptographic protocols that provide end-
to-end communication security for the transport layer of IP network.
TLS Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security (TLS) is application layer cryptographic protocols that provide
end-to-end communication security for the transport layer of IP network.
SSH Secure Shell Secure Shell is an application layer cryptographic network protocol used for operating
network services securely over an unsecured network.
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol DHCP is an application layer protocol used for dynamically distribute network configuration
parameters such as IP addresses to network devices on a IP based network
BGP Border Gateway Protocol BGP is an application layer protocol used to exchange routing and reachability information
among autonomous (AS) on the Internet.
NTP Network Time Protocol NTP is an application layer protocol used for clock synchronization of network devices on
a variable latency IP data network.
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol SNMP is an application layer protocol used for collecting, organizing information about the
managed devices and modify them to change behavior of the devices on IP networks.
TCP Transport Control Protocol TCP is one of the core transport layer protocol in TCP/IP protocol suite used for reliable,
ordered and error free delivery of packets between two hosts communicating on IP networks.
UDP User Datagram Protocol UDP is one of the another core transport layer protocol in TCP/IP protocol suite used for
unreliable, unordered but fast delivery of packets between two hosts communicating on IP
networks.
IP Internet Protocol IP is the principle network protocol in the TCP/IP protocol suite for relaying datagrams
across network boundaries solely based on the IP addresses in the datagram header.
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol ICMP is a network layer protocol used by network devices, like routers, to send messages
and operational information indicating issues along the path of the datagram in Internet.
ARP Address Resolution Protocol ARP is a network layer protocol used for the resolution of IP addresses into link layer
addresses which are mostly Media Access Control (MAC)addresses.
GRE Generic Routing Protocol Generic Routing Protocol is network layer tunnelling protocol used to create peer-to-peer
network by establishing point-to-point connections between network nodes.
